CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THROUGH
MINE ACTION ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA
By Guy Rhodes, Ph.D. [ Geneva Centre for Security Policy ]

on further developing the legal and institutional frameworks for the
sector and the potential role that the international community may
offer in contributing to peace dividends, both by its presence, and its
experience gained elsewhere in the world that may have application
in Korea.

HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR AND THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
In the English-speaking world, the Korean War has been called “The
Forgotten War,” as its memory is often overshadowed by World War
II and the Vietnam War. It was, however, one of the most devastating conflicts of the modern era. It incurred the destruction of virtually all of Korea’s major cities and resulted in approximately 3 million
Handshake between North and South Korean Military at the DMZ, October 2018.
Image courtesy of MND Archives.
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war fatalities with a larger proportional civilian death toll than either
World War II or the Vietnam War. 3
The conflict was between North Korea (with the support of China

he Korean Peninsula is divided by a strip of land, the

and the Soviet Union) and South Korea (with the support of the UNC,

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which represents the de facto

principally the United States but with combat troops from sixteen

border between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

additional states under a UN Flag). It began on 25 June 1950 and

(DPRK), more commonly known as North Korea, and the Republic of

ended on 27 July 1953 when the UNC and the Chinese-North Korean

Korea (ROK), or South Korea. Contrary to its name, the DMZ is the

Command signed the Korean Armistice Agreement.

most militarized zone on earth, and it delineates a stand-off between
militaries composed of several million professional and reservist soldiers on both sides. It is the “Cold War’s last divide”1 and one of the
most symbolic barriers between two nations. It is also heavily mined
with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines, and contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO) from extensive ground battles and heavy aerial bombardment.
This article explores the nature and extent of explosive ordnance
contamination and the physical environment within the DMZ. It
considers recent changes in the political landscape that have allowed
unprecedented developments within the DMZ to take place—including coordinated demining operations between military forces of
North and South Korea, as well as the beginning of a human remains
recovery program.

Signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
Photo courtesy of File/AP.

The armistice established the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and

Joint demining operations are currently suspended and the political

the DMZ, a 4 km wide and 250 km long fortified buffer zone between

situation remains complex, but mines do not go away. The opportu-

the two Korean nations. After the agreement, a withdrawal of forces

nity that mine action offers to contribute to confidence building on the

and the rapid establishment of the DMZ left thousands of human

Korean Peninsula is without parallel; such potential is explored here.

remains within its boundaries, which are only now being recovered.

In this context and notwithstanding the considerable expertise,

The armistice remains only a cease-fire arrangement between military

resources, and perspectives of the two Koreas and that of the US-led

forces rather than an agreement between governments to normalize

United Nations Command (UNC), 2 this article suggests a vision for the

relations. No formal peace treaty has been signed, and the two nations

architecture of mine action on the peninsula. This includes thoughts

technically remain at war.
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Missile Crisis (1962) and the buildup to
the Seoul Olympics (1988).
Contamination

originating

from

ground battles and aerial bombardment such as grenades, artillery shells,
and mortars is widespread but less well
defined. It is present on the surface of the
ground and at shallow depths, and in the
case of air-delivered bombs, often at considerable depth.
Table 1 details contamination known
in the DMZ and CCZ as reported by
the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The exact
number could be appreciably more, with
Figure 1. Map of the central portion of the Korean Peninsula showing the DMZ and surrounding border areas.
Figure courtesy of Park Eun-Jin et al, 2012.

some sources quoting between 1 and 1.2
million mines in total on the south side.
Far less is known about the mine-laying

BORDER AREA ZONING
The DMZ and surrounding border areas to the south are divided
into three zones: the DMZ itself, the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), and
the Border Area (Figure 1). The DMZ is split 2 km north and 2 km
south of the MDL, with half of the DMZ located in the ROK and half
in the DPRK. The outer limits of the DMZ are termed the Northern
Limit Line (NLL) and Southern Limit Line (SLL). This area was established to safeguard against incidents that may provoke hostilities,4 and

strategies and quantities of mines deployed by North Korean forces.
The numbers of mines are reported to be at least as many as those to
the south of the MDL, with some sources suggesting numbers may be
twice as high.6

THE CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA, 2018–2020

in accordance with the armistice, the jurisdiction for the southern portion of the DMZ falls under the responsibility of the US-led UNC.5
Conversely, the jurisdiction of the CCZ rests with the ROK Army, and
the Border Area under that of the local governments.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE EXPLOSIVE
ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION
Landmines and UXO are present in all three zones of jurisdiction on
the ROK side of the border: the DMZ, the CCZ, and the northern parts of
the Border Area. They are also present around some military installations
and bases elsewhere on the southern portion of the peninsula.
Mined areas in the DMZ, and to some extent the CCZ, are not as
defined as one might expect. While many minefields have records,
mines have also been air-delivered and laid hastily, creating uncertainty in several areas. In addition, variation in statistics may also
be reflective of failures in knowledge management practices over the
past sixty-seven years. Much of the contamination is ageing, although
there have been periods of mine replenishment and reinforcement
during periods of heightened tension—such as during the Cuban

Signing of the CMA by ROK and DPRK Ministers of Defense, September 2018.
Image courtesy of Pyeongyang Press Corps.

Although the political situation has become more complex on the
peninsula since the Hanoi Summit between the United States and
North Korea in February 2019, the developments that occurred in
2018 were ground breaking. On 27 April 2018, the two Koreas held
a summit between South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in and North
Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong Un. This meeting resulted in the two
leaders signing the Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and
Reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Total

Sites

1,308

Mines 828,000

Controlled Protection Zones

Rear
Areas

DMZ

CCZ

786
(15 undocumented)

433
(276 undocumented)

22

67

380,000

389,000

50,000

9,000

Table 1. Status of confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) in South Korea.
Table courtesy of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS).
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The Panmunjom Declaration led to
other bilateral declarations and summits involving South Korea, North
Korea, and the United States. On 19 September 2018, the respective Ministers
of Defense for North and South Korea
signed an unprecedented Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA).

from the CCZ, southern edge of the Civilian
Control Line (CCL), and particularly from sites
around military bases and installations in the
Rear Areas across the ROK.
Since 2018 and under the auspices of the CMA,
clearance activities within the DMZ itself have
been undertaken at the JSA at Panmunjom and at
the formal battle site at Arrowhead Hill.
Demining at the Joint Security Area (Figure 2
Label 4). The Panmunjom JSA is the only portion
of the DMZ where North and South Korean forces
stand face-to-face. The JSA is used for diplomatic
engagements.
Deminers from the 127 ROK Army Engineering
Battalion, supported by the UNC, conducted
operations within the southern portion of the JSA
(shaded blue in Figure 3). The U.S. Army Corps of
Figure 2. Key elements of the Comprehensive Military Agreement.
Figure courtesy of an illustration in Global Asia Vol 14, no. 2, June 2019.

The CMA focused on five areas: (1) suspension of hostile activities,
(2) military measures to transform the DMZ into a peace zone, (3)
establishment of a marine peace zone, (4) military communication and
exchange, and (5) measures to promote military confidence building.
Of particular interest for this article are the two annexes to the CMA
concerning demining operations at the Joint Security Area (JSA) at
Panmunjom, and at the former battle ground at Arrowhead Hill. These
annexes set the scene for collaborative demining operations between
the ROK, DPRK, and the UNC that began on 1 October 2018—a joint
activity that was unimaginable twelve months before. While engagement occurred for a period, subsequent strained relations led to an

First tri-lateral negotiations on the implementation of the CMA, 16 October 2018.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.

effective freeze in confidence-building initiatives, and joint opera-

Engineers and representation from the U.S. Department of State acted

tions did not resume in 2019. This remains the status quo as of June

as observers. In northern zones (shaded yellow), the Korean People’s

2020; however, mines do not disappear, and the political environment

Army (KPA) conducted its own independent clearance operations.7

can change quickly. For the time being, ROK Army demining units,

At times, ROK-UNC teams were in proximity to DPRK teams and

supported by the UNC continue to work unilaterally, but mine action

exchanged cordial greetings and conversations. Both sides focused on

will continue to offer considerable opportunities and powerful optics

areas of suspected mine and UXO contamination with the intent to

for confidence building between the DPRK and ROK when conditions

further demilitarize the JSA and support greater tourist circulation.

again become conducive.

The operations are now complete on the south side and declared complete on the north.
Operations of the ROK Army in the southern sectors between 1 and

DEMINING OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ

19 October cleared 36,461 sq m of land and recovered considerable

Location

Year

Area

Mines Removed

CCZ

2006–2017

14 sites

1,443

Southern CCL/
Border Areas

2005–2017

42 sites

5,405

between 1 and 18 October. The KPA appeared to use detectors, primi-

Rear Areas

1998–2017

76 sites

58,872

the removal and destruction of 636 mines.8

132

65,720

Total

Table 2. Mine clearance status to 2017 from ROK military operations.
Table courtesy of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS).

quantities of metal debris, but no mines were present. To the north, the
KPA were observed conducting demining operations at three localities
tive probes, and pitch-fork-style tools within operations that claimed
An underlying challenge during the JSA clearance task was the lack
of common standards for operations, particularly in quality management procedures for released land. Both the ROK Army and the DPRK

Demining operations in South Korea before 2018 were largely

KPA used different military doctrines for demining, and there was a

restricted to areas away from the DMZ. Table 2 illustrates the clear-

disparity in demining resources and equipment. In the longer term,

ance statistics from 1998–2017. A total of 65,720 mines were cleared

the UNC suggests that joint mine action operations would benefit from
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Figure 3. JSA demining zones.
Figure courtesy of LTC S. Morrow.

ROK-Army deminers at JSA.
Image courtesy of LTC S. Morrow.

being based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)—
adapted to the context and conditions of the DMZ.

The joint operations with the DPRK in 2018 did not continue when
demining by the ROK resumed in the southern half of the DMZ at

Arrowhead Hill demining to support human remains recovery

Arrowhead Hill in April 2019 following a deterioration of relations

(Figure 2 Label 5). Atop of a little-known ridge in the Cheorwon

among parties to the conflict in early 2019. However, the ROK Army

Valley almost seven decades ago, French, South Korean, and American

and UNC made a decision to continue the operation. When clear-

troops fought off waves of mainly Chinese communist forces in a series

ance concluded for the winter in November 2019, 102,688 sq m of land

of trench battles that marked some of the bloodiest days of the Korean

had been released, 455 mines and 5,754 UXO cleared, and 261 sets of

War. Hundreds of the fallen were never recovered. Of the Chinese and

human remains recovered.

South Korean losses alone, it is estimated that 6,700 and 14,332 troops

Future plans for the human remains recovery program. The

fell, respectively. Over a nine-day period, the U.S. Air Force dropped

remains recovery program for 2020 is planned to first be completed at

2,700 bombs, the Chinese fired 55,000 shells, and South Korea fired

Arrowhead Hill. Beyond this site operations are envisaged to continue

185,000 more around Hill 281, also known as Arrowhead Hill.

in the spirit of the CMA on a unilateral basis by demining units of

9

Under the CMA, the first joint remains recovery task in the

the ROK Army supported by the UNC. In conjunction with records

DMZ was conducted at Arrowhead Hill. This included the con-

supplied by the Sending States,10 operations will focus on additional

struction of a 3 km access road (1.7 km from the south side and

battle sites not specified in the CMA that are expected to yield more

1.3 km from the north) to serve mine clearance and joint remains

remains. Possible sites may be drawn from the conflict zones such

recovery operations.

as Bunker Hill, Old Baldy, Iron Triangle, Northern Punchbowl, and
Heartbreak Ridge.

Access route cleared by KPA to Arrowhead Hill to facilitate demining.
Image courtesy of MND Archives.
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Human remains recovery, Arrowhead Hill.
Image courtesy of The Wall Street Journal.

Human remains excavation.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.

Remains are honored.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.

Indeed, since the signing of the armistice in
1953, there has been a revival of wild habitats
in the absence of human activity. According to
the National Institute of Ecology (2018),11 6,168
species of flora and fauna have been documented in the DMZ with 102 species classified
as endangered or vulnerable. These are spread
across varied landscapes of wetlands, plains,
and mountains from the Imjin River Estuary in
the west to the coastal region of the east.
Figure 4. Battle site locations of potential DMZ Remains Recovery and Demining Operations 2020+.
Figure courtesy of a MND/UNC presentation, Geneva, February 2020.

Conducting survey and clearance operations in this wildlife refuge carries a tremendous responsibility and demands the
utmost respect for the environment. By its
very nature, demining is disruptive, but there
are many approaches to mitigate its impact.
IMAS 07.13 Environmental Management in
Mine Action is a good point of departure,
but future National Mine Action Standards
for Korea (yet to be developed) should be
far more comprehensive and prescriptive in
nature. The competing challenges of demining and environmental preservation call on
heightened collaboration between authorities concerned with clearance operations and
those institutions and ministries dealing with
conservation of the natural habitat.
Appropriate demining methods and tools will
need to be considered together with integrated

Figure 5. Biodiversity report of the DMZ Area/MOE-NIE (2016).
Figure courtesy of Ministry of Environment, National Institute of Ecology (2016).

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND BIODIVERSITY
OF THE DMZ

planning and priority-setting approaches that
are responsive to ecological sensitivities. In
some cases, this may be achieved through timing and sequencing of operations that do not conflict with the nesting
and mating cycles of endangered birds and mammals. In others, con-

In his address at the 74th United Nations General Assembly

sideration of the diminishing risk from ageing ordnance may support

(UNGA) in September 2019, ROK President Moon Jae-in described the

a decision that certain areas of particular environmental importance

DMZ as “a colossal green zone…its borders define a tragedy spawned

will not be prioritized, at least not as a starting point. Considering the

by 70 years of military confrontation, but paradoxically, it has become

enormous size of the DMZ and the reality that clearance operations

a pristine ecological treasure trove.”

will take decades to complete, this would appear entirely reasonable,
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especially if the threat from explosive hazards in these areas is low,

crises, peace-keeping frameworks, and in assisted development and

poorly-defined, or deeply-buried. Mine action is about manageing risk

development contexts. Such an international capacity should not be

from explosive ordnance; searching every square meter of the DMZ for

considered as competition to the highly-trained and equipped ROK

explosive devices is unnecessary.

Army demining units but rather a different type of capacity that pres-

Certain conservation areas may be managed by continuing to limit

ents additional opportunities.

or exclude human activity through signage and education. This would

International organizations are committed to assist in the world-

be consistent with some areas contaminated by explosive ordnance

wide clearance of landmines and UXO but are particularly motivated

in Western Europe that remain “out of bounds” to the general pub-

by contexts where mine action can also contribute to a greater goal.

lic, such as the former Soviet military training range at Wittstock,

Nowhere is this potential more evident than on the Korean Peninsula.

Brandenburg, located in the former East Germany.

Although somewhat distant at present, future assistance may also be

POTENTIAL ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION COMMUNITY

channeled through Pyongyang, although the sanction regime and
position of the North Korean government currently render this prospect as fanciful. Demining on the Korean Peninsula, however, should
be considered a long-term prospect.
The DPRK is a more natural partner for international organizations, as the ROK is not a recipient of aid—indeed it is a considerable
international donor itself for mine action. The ROK is an economic
heavyweight with a gross domestic product that exceeds many of
the principal international donors such as Australia, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, and Norway. However, the context on the Korean
Peninsula is not a normal one. In order to maximize peace dividends, a
coordinated approach that draws on national and international capaci-

International Seminar November 2018. NGO’s Role for Mine Clearance in the DMZ,
including UNMAS, UNDP, ICRC, GICHD, HALO, NPA, APMBC-ISU, GMAP, FSD, ICBL,
JCBL, and PCBL.
Image courtesy of the Peace Sharing Association (PSA).

At the 74th UNGA, President Moon also presented a vision to
transform the DMZ into an international peace zone, “The DMZ has
become a symbolic space steeped in history, which embraces both the
tragedy of division as embodied by the JSA, guard posts and barbed-

ties and skillsets may be more effective.
Importantly, the UNC is unequivocal in its support of President
Moon’s vision of clearing the DMZ of landmines and UXO. This has
been reiterated on several occasions by General Robert Abrams, the
Commander of the UNC and U.S. Forces Korea. Furthermore, the
addition of international expertise and capacity, including international NGOs, is also supported by the UNC.

wire fences as well as the yearning for peace. The DMZ is the common heritage of humankind, and its value must be shared with the
whole world. Once peace is established between the two Koreas, I will
work together with North Korea to inscribe the DMZ as a UNESCO
World Heritage Site.” He went on to say, “Approximately 380,000 antipersonnel mines are laid in the DMZ, and it is expected to take 15 years
for South Korean troops to remove them on their own.”12 However,
cooperation with the international community, including the United
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), will not only guarantee the
transparency and stability of demining operations, but also instantly
turn the DMZ into an area of international cooperation.”13

Mine Action Workshop, January 2019. United Nations Command, US Forces Korea,
Combined Forces Command, 8th Army, ICRC, UNMAS, ROK Ministry of National
Defense, ROK Army, ROK MoFA, US Army Corps of Engineers, The HALO Trust, NPA,
MAG, GICHD, US DoS, Norwegian Embassy, Netherlands Embassy, British Embassy,
Australian Embassy.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.

Notwithstanding security considerations, current legislation
restrictions, and necessary solutions for appropriate funding mechanisms, the addition of the international community working in the
DMZ would serve two principal objectives: (1) it would offer additional capacity, and (2) perhaps more important, it would be a significant step in further demilitarizing the border zone.
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING OF
MINE ACTION FRAMEWORKS ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA
Demining the DMZ is a considerable undertaking, which will take
decades. Whether operations are upscaled soon or in a few years, it

International NGOs and the United Nations strive to uphold the

takes time to establish the legal, institutional, strategic, and opera-

humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and

tional frameworks to support such a considerable task. It is vital that

independence; and could provide an additional “face;” and offer fur-

an appropriate framework is established at an early stage in order to

ther tools and approaches to contribute to the goal of securing sustain-

maintain confidence in the safety, quality, and environmental accept-

able peace. They also come with thirty years of humanitarian demining

ability of survey and clearance operations whether they be delivered by

experience—gained through working in conflict zones, humanitarian

military, commercial, or NGO capacities.
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Institutions. It is important to establish an appropriate legal and
institutional framework to accommodate expanding programs, particularly if a variety of demining operators are to be employed. Such a
framework should define an architecture of regulation, management,
and coordination. More than just a technical activity, demining has
implications across ministries and sectors. This should be reflected in
the governance structure with a view to corresponding architecture
within the North Korean authorities.
There are many variations on institutional frameworks for mine
action programs that have varying degrees of military and civilian representation and authority. In the context of Korea, this will inevitably
be skewed towards the military. In a generic model, the most senior
level—a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), perhaps under the
prime minister—is typically responsible for policy and coordination
across ministries, which include those with implementation responsibilities (Defense and Foreign Affairs), those affected by contamination (Environment and Agriculture), and those with economic roles
(Planning and Finance). The NMAA would normally approve the
overall mine action strategy, national standards, annual workplans,
and priorities. With jurisdiction over the DMZ in the ROK, the UNC
should also be positioned appropriately for decision-making procedures linked to either the NMAA or the Mine Action Centre (MAC).
Below the NMAA, the MAC typically coordinates national and international operators. It manages daily operations that could include mine
risk education and victim assistance, while also monitoring the quality of operations. The MAC would also be responsible for information
management, including the national database, and developing national
mine action standards (NMAS). The Ministry of National Defense
(MND) may serve as a suitable host for such an office and function.
At an operational level, implementers could potentially be national
or international organizations, military units, or non-profit/commercial entities. They operate in accordance with NMAS and are usually
accredited and monitored by teams from the MAC.
Standards. A peace zone is compromised if accidents occur after
demining operations take place or if the safety of the land is in question. Confidence-building measures can be damaged or reversed if
mines remain in the ground and subsequent injury or death occurs.
A common reference framework could have been beneficial during
the 2018–2019 operations at the JSA and Arrowhead Hill. Observations
of the demining that occurred under the CMA, particularly to the

Figure 6. Front cover of the IMAS in Korean.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.

(PSA) to translate the IMAS into Korean. This was completed and provides a comprehensive set of documents from which to draw upon to
develop the National (Korean) Mine Action Standards (KMAS). These
should be adapted to the context of the peninsula while remaining
compliant to the overarching IMAS.
The KMAS will be defined by the ROK authorities. If adopted, the
KMAS would ensure that different organizations deliver a common
and consistent approach to demining, ensuring safety, efficiency and
effectiveness, and confidence that the quality of cleared land is maintained and assured.
Recent developments offer the option to database the Korean version
of the IMAS to facilitate the navigation and interrogation of more than
1,000 pages of technical material. Such an exercise has only recently
been completed for the IMAS in English.14 Bringing the Korean version
into the newly established IMAS database would provide the peninsula
with a tool at the forefront of the global mine action sector.
By databasing the requirements and recommendations of IMAS,
Korea will be able to dynamically filter the standards to create targeted
checklists for self-assessment or external-compliance monitoring purposes. Korea could benefit from the work already done, which would
allow a straightforward review of existing military doctrines against
IMAS, identifying and addressing any gaps that may be present.15

north of the MDL, raised some questions about the reliability of the
procedures and quality management systems in use.
The IMAS are the reference standards for the United Nations and
international community, developed over the course of twenty years by
a wide range of mine action stakeholders. The IMAS are used in over
fifty countries, including by
•

the UK government for clearance operations on the Falkland
Islands,

•

the US Humanitarian Demining Training Center as a basis for
training US forces, and

•

the Chinese military undertaking demining in Peace Keeping
Operations.

In 2019, the MND commissioned the Peace Sharing Association

Figure 7. Relationship between IMAS, NMAS, SOPs, and
training material.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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the means to inform decision makers
and to manage and monitor operations.
Moreover, they record what activities
were completed where, when, and by
whom. This safeguards against duplication, facilitates planning and reporting,
and may be important to address any
future liability considerations.
The information management database stores information on known or suspected areas of contamination together
with other datasets such as access routes,
vegetation cover, topography, land ownership, various war archive data, and
environmental information—ideally in
an integrated system to support planning and priority setting. It should be
designed and developed with the whole
Figure 8. A visual example displaying mine contamination data.
Figure reproduction of a slide used by the author at the DMZ Global Forum in Seoul, November 2019.

DMZ in mind. Understanding that some
data is sensitive, information management
systems can easily be designed to have dif-

The IMAS have a close relationship with international conventions
on disarmament and are the reference point for donors and spon-

ferent levels of access and authority, but it is important to balance
appropriate transparency with security and other considerations.

sors of mine action. International financial support will be important

Research. There are many opportunities to share cross-border

for the future of the peninsula, particularly initiatives in the north.

experiences and knowledge, but one research area stands out when

Funding would be more forthcoming if programs operated within the

considering demining and the importance of the preservation of the

recognized framework of IMAS. When conducive, moving towards

environment. This is the understanding of how risk changes as muni-

a common framework for the entire peninsula has potential to be an

tions age. What are the impacts of changing circumstances and condi-

important process.

tions that surround mines and UXO on the Korean Peninsula? This has

Information Management. For the considerable task of demin-

great implications when making informed decisions on priority setting

ing the DMZ, a state-of-the-art information management system is

and balancing risk from explosive devices with a desire to retain the

essential. Databases and geographic information systems provide

integrity of a fragile environment.

PMD-6 box mine.
Images courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.

Weathered PMD-6 mine.

M16 mine with fuse and weathered M16 without.

The ageing process affects different devices in different ways.
The energy required for arming and initiation of mines is often
supplied by springs. Where springs have corroded, the munition
is incapable of functioning as designed. For instance, the wooden
box mine, which is understood to have been widely used by North
Korean forces, has a case that is prone to disintegrate over time.16
Figure 9. Generic illustration of the ageing process of different components of
a mine.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
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It also has a fuse with a firing chain that can be disrupted by corrosion. In the south, the M16 mine is metallic and rusts over time.
It may become unrecognizable. Other mines such as the M14

anti-personnel mine are more resilient. However, there is some
reassurance that mines will pose a diminishing risk in the long
term, but it is difficult to quantify.

First, adjusting national legislation for mine action to allow nonmilitary capacities to contribute to demining.
Second, ensuring that the institutional and strategic frameworks
for mine action reflect the inter-ministerial nature of the problem and

THE VISION FOR MINE ACTION ON THE
PENINSULA
However fanciful, programs should have a vision. The vision for

support a longer-term goal of a joint mine action architecture for the
entire peninsula. The MND in its appropriate role could also strive to
be more accessible and open for exchange.

the Korean Peninsula is that an architecture for demining the DMZ

Third, further adaptation of operational frameworks such as stan-

is jointly owned by both North and South Korea, and that demining

dards in operations (including quality management systems) of the

operations address shared objectives and priorities and are undertaken

military and alignment with recognized international norms and

in accordance with common practices within a framework of recog-

practices. The development of KMAS based on IMAS offers an early

nized international norms.

and significant opportunity in this respect.
Fourth, pursuit of research and international exchange on pertinent issues of relevance to Korea. For example, the management of
risk concerning ageing explosive ordnance, mitigation approaches
towards environmental impact, advanced prioritization schemes for
operations, and appropriate information management systems and
processes that are fit for purpose.
Fifth, promotion of information sharing and appropriate transparency with the DPRK to inform the process of developing a mine
action machinery that is geared toward peace, not war. Optics are
important. Consideration could be given to having deminers dressed
in a neutral attire rather than military fatigues.
These suggested adjustments to the mine action ethos and architecture in Korea will help ensure the success of operations, where “suc-

Figure 10. A vision of linked institutions, joint mine action strategies,
and operations on the Korean Peninsula.
Figure courtesy of the author.

cess” will be measured in peace dividends that are linked to safety and
confidence of cleared land and the value of activities that mine action
helps to facilitate.

When it eventually comes, the signing of a Peace Agreement will

In the absence of collaboration with the DPRK, a reformed mine

provide an opportunity to establish a more integrated institutional

action sector in the ROK will be beneficial to support unilateral activi-

framework with North Korea to reinforce a unified approach to

ties. It will also ensure that the ROK is well equipped to accommodate

demining the DMZ. This could involve elements of a joint author-

all confidence-building opportunities that mine action can offer, and

ity and steps towards a common MAC. In the meantime, much can

in addition, position itself to support the inevitable upscaling of opera-

be done unilaterally to advance mine action programs, involve the

tions in the future.
See endnotes page 68

international community, and explore further how mine action
activities can be used to build confidence on the Korean Peninsula.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Peace on the Korean Peninsula remains a long process, and while
the climate for confidence-building opportunities is currently at a low
ebb, landmines in the DMZ do not go away. Nor do the opportunities
that mine action offers to contribute to reconciliation and peace.
It takes time to adapt an architecture for mine action outside a
purely military lens, but this is necessary to establish the fundamentals needed to underpin all opportunities for mine action in the future.
President Moon has a vision for a peace zone in the DMZ free from
mines and UXO, and he believes that cooperation with the international community will both guarantee the transparency and stability
of demining operations and help turn the DMZ into an area of international cooperation. This vision is supported by the UNC.
To help prepare for future work, the relevant authorities could
benefit from considering five key recommendations to help achieve
this vision.
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